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PROFESSOR CHIARA GIORGETTI 
 
AUTHOR:  
Professor Chiara Giorgetti teaches and writes in the 
areas of international law, international arbitration, 
international dispute resolution, and state failure and 
fragility. She has authored over a dozen publications on 
these topics, and her JSD doctoral dissertation resulted in 
the publication of her book, A Principled Approach to State 
Failure, International Community Actions in Emergency 
Situations, in 2010. Prior to joining the Richmond Law 
faculty in 2012, Professor Giorgetti practiced international 
arbitration in Washington D.C. and Geneva, Switzerland. 
Professor Giorgetti also worked extensively with the 
United Nations in New York and Somalia, where she 
oversaw the implementation of United Nations 
Development Programme governance programs. She has 
served as a consultant for various international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations and 
taught advanced international courses at Georgetown Law 
Center. Professor Giorgetti clerked at the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague. She is an active member of 
the American Society of International Law (ASIL) and co-
chaired its 2011 annual meeting. She also founded and co-
chairs ASIL's Interest Group on International Courts and 
Tribunals. 
 
REMARKS:
I would like to thank the organizers of this event for 
inviting me to talk today about a topic which is both timely 
and important: The Arab Spring and Syria.  I was asked to 
be brief and provocative, and I hope that I can do both in 
my presentation.  I would like to make three points.  First, I 
would like to briefly discuss the doctrine of Responsibility 
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to Protect, and its legal and political implications.  Then, I 
will examine how the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has 
been recently applied in Libya.  Finally, building on these 
two elements, I will assess the applicability of the 
Responsibility to Protect principle in the context of the 
crisis in Syria.   
  
To start, the Responsibility to Protect is a doctrine 
that, among other things, and at its maximum, allows 
members of the international community or a state to 
intervene to address mass atrocities and human rights 
abuses in another State, which causes these mass 
atrocities.1  This doctrine, also known as R2P, has been a 
much-discussed topic since 2000 in international law, 
international politics, and international relations.  R2P has 
been both a promising and, at the same time, a 
disappointing concept.   
Conventional wisdom says that R2P was developed as a 
reaction to the United Nations (U.N.) and the Security 
Council’s lack of action in Rwanda and Yugoslavia (both 
in Bosnia and Kosovo).  It was meant as a way to overcome 
the deadlock created by the veto-based voting system of the 
Security Council and to ensure that the international 
community would address gross violations of human rights 
effectively.   
 
 In my view, it is more correct to see the 
development of the R2P as a policy reinterpretation of the 
U.N.’s role, in general, in intervention to maintain 
                                                           
1
 See infra, Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State 
Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect, 6 (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; See also 
generally, Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to 
Protect, 48 Stan. J. Int’l L, 319 (2012). 
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international peace and security.2  As such, it comes in the 
aftermath, not only of inaction in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, 
but also of the attempted first interventions in Somalia, East 
Timor, Iraq, and Haiti.  This means that R2P comes at a 
time when the U.N. is trying to redefine a role for itself in 
international crises and on matters that were newly 
considered to be a “threat to international peace and 
security.”  Therefore, it is a continuation of the rebalancing 
of the sovereignty and intervention dichotomy, and it 
addresses the question of to whom sovereignty belongs.  
The R2P debate continues the discussion on sovereignty 
that belongs to the people and not to the State, and 
intervention as protection of that sovereignty.3 
 
 R2P provides a framework for action so that the 
international community and other States have a right of 
intervention in cases of mass human rights violations.  This 
right is rephrased as a duty and as an obligation that States 
have to intervene in case of egregious mass violations of 
human rights.  It is structured as an intervention to 
overcome the veto-holding powers in the Security Council 
so that States have to act and have a justification or reason 
to act.   
                                                           
2
 See U.N. Charter art. 1 (stating that the first purpose of the United 
Nations is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”); See also U.N. 
Charter art 41 (“the Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
[…], to maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
3
 W Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law,  84 Am. J Int’l L 866, 872 (1990).  
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R2P was first discussed in a 2001 Canadian report 
commissioned and published by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS).4  The Report, called The Responsibility to Protect, 
provides for an escalating three-prong process: First, the 
state itself has a primary duty to prevent mass human rights 
violation. Second, it is the duty of the state itself to protect 
civilians. Third, and only if the first two procedures fail, 
there is a duty to intervene by outside States.5  Throughout 
this process, the role of the Security Council in securing 
peace remains.  
 
 In 2005, the U.N. World Summit endorsed the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine in its Outcome 
Document, which was also formally adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly.  As adopted, the RP2 was much scaled 
down and diluted.  The Outcome Document provides that:  
 
138. Each individual State 
has the responsibility to 
protect its populations form 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility 
entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their 
incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary 
means. 
 
                                                           
4
 Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, 
The Responsibility To Protect, 6 (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.  
5
 Id. 
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139. …We [States] are 
prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis, in 
cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations, as 
appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and 
national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against 
humanity.6 
 
And so this is my first provocative point: R2P was very 
important politically in trying to reframe the issue of 
intervention differently, but legally it didn’t really change 
anything.  The role of the Security Council is maintained 
and the initial responsibility to protect remains on the State.  
In the Outcome Document, as paragraph 139 demonstrates, 
states essentially agree to act in accordance to the UN 
Charter. In 2005, States further diluted R2P by restricting 
and defining the mass violations that would entail the 
intervention and responsibility to protect. 
 
The second provocative point relates to the 
intervention in Libya in 2011, often considered and 
                                                           
6
 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenEl
ement. 
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presented as a triumph of R2P.  The Economist said that is 
was finally R2P in action. 7 But if one looks at the language 
of the U.N. Security Council resolution 1973/2011, it only 
states that the responsibility to protect its people rests with 
the Libyan government.8  There is no mention of the 
responsibility to protect in reference to the international 
community. The mandate that gave power to NATO and 
other States, and created sanctions, was based on a different 
principle, not R2P.  The resolution provides 
 
The Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United 
Nations, authorized members 
states that have notified the 
Secretary General, acting 
nationally or through regional 
organizations or 
arrangements, and acting in 
cooperation with the 
Secretary General “to take all 
necessary measures … to 
protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat 
of attack” in Libya.9 
 
The third provocative point is about Syria.  Is the 
Responsibility to Protect going to be something that can 
help resolve the Syrian crisis?  I think that it is very 
unlikely that this will happen.  Not only as an R2P, but also 
                                                           
7
 The Lessons of Libya, Economist, May 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18709571. 
8
 S.C. Res. 1973 ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) 
available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011) 
9
 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (March 17, 2011). 
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generally as an act of intervention, the Syrian crisis is much 
more complicated than the crisis in Libya.  Political and 
economic issues are very different from those that were 
present in Libya, and are much more complex.  But 
furthermore, because of what happened in Libya and how 
the R2P principle is seen as having been applied in Libya, I 
think it is even less likely that the principle would be 
applied in Syria.10  Unless major changes occur, I doubt we 
will see any R2P intervention and use of military force 
sanctioned by the U.N. to protect the people of Syria. 
 
Thank you, and I look forward to your comments 
and questions. 
 
Post-Script: Few months after delivering these 
remarks, the situation in Syria has not changed. The civil 
war continues and the international community has been 
unable to agree to intervene to protect civilians. At the end 
of April 2013, however, President Obama declared that the 
use of chemical weapons against civilians would be a 
“game changer.” 
 
                                                           
10
 See Charles Homans, Responsibility to Protect: A Short History, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 2011, at 34-35, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/responsibility_to_pr
otect_a_short_history. 
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donor nations.  So, in the meetings in Jordan, the president 
of the Polish legal clinic association was there to talk about 
their recent experience, and we had South African, Spanish, 
French and Indian law professors there who were talking 
about their experience with clinical legal education.  I do 
not think this is something that you could sell as “made in 
America,” even though we have a rich and long tradition of 
legal clinical education.  It will not work if it is not wanted 
locally, and it feels to me as though there is a reason why 
this movement has flourished and grown so exponentially.  
That is also why there is such promise for clinical legal 
education in the Middle East.  
 
My sense is that this kind of experiential learning is 
universal and that what we know about adult learning and 
cognition tells us that people love to learn experientially, 
and do so quite effectively.  Students increasingly demand 
it, and I hope you do here.  
